Mike Busch | Blackstone Laboratories

EGT Myths Debunked

Reprinted with permission from the author, Mike Busch

Pilots still seem to have a lot of misconceptions about exhaust gas temperature (EGT). Let’s see if we can clear some of them up.

These days, pilots of piston-powered aircraft seem to have fixated upon EGT. Scarcely a day goes by that I don’t receive a phone call, email, or support ticket asking some EGT-related question.

Pilots will send me a list of EGT readings for each of their cylinders and ask me if think they look okay, whether I think their EGTs are too high, what maximum EGT limit I recommend, why their EGTs seem to be higher in the winter than in the summer, or why the EGTs on their 1972 Cessna 182 are so much higher than the ones on their friend’s 1977 model. They’ll voice concern that the individual cylinders on their engine have such diverse EGT readings, worry that the spread between the highest and lowest EGT is excessive, and ask for advice on how to bring them closer together. They’ll complain that they are unable to transition from rich-of-peak (ROP) to lean-of-peak (LOP) operation without producing EGTs that are unacceptably high.

Each of these questions reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what EGT measures, what it means, and how it is interpreted. Let me attempt to clear up some of this confusion by asking you to forget everything you thought you knew about EGT and start at the beginning.

What EGT is not

The absolute values of EGT are not particularly interesting for a number of reasons. The most important is that indicated EGT is not a “real” temperature. To understand what I mean by this, I’d like you to conduct a thought experiment: Imagine that you’re an EGT probe, located in an exhaust riser between two and four inches from the exhaust port of a cylinders, and think about what you would see.

You’d see nothing much for two-thirds of the time¾during most of the intake, compression, and power strokes, because the exhaust valve is closed and so no exhaust gas is flowing out of the exhaust port and past the probe. During the one-third of the time that the exhaust valve is open, you’d see a constantly changing gas temperature that starts out very hot when the valve first opens but cools very rapidly as the hot compressed gas escapes and expands, and then ultimately is scavenged by cold induction air during the valve overlap period (at the end of the exhaust stroke and the beginning of the intake stroke) when both intake and exhaust valves are open simultaneously.

Now, all these gyrations are happening about 20 times per second, and you (the EGT probe) cannot possibly keep up with them. You wind up stabilizing at some temperature between the hottest and coolest gas temperature you see, and you dutifully report this rather arbitrary temperature to the panel-mounted instrument, where it is displayed to the pilot as a digital value accurate to one degree. The temperature you report to the pilot is not exhaust gas temperature (which is gyrating crazily 20 times a second) but rather exhaust probe temperature (which is stable but related to actual exhaust gas temperature in roughly the same fashion as mean sea level is to high tide).

To make matters worse, numerous factors can affect indicated EGT besides actual exhaust gas temperature. These include probe mass and construction (grounded or ungrounded), cam lobe profile, lifter leak-down rate, valve spring condition, and exhaust manifold topology, among others.

For example, the two front cylinders (numbers 5 and 6) on the left engine of my Cessna T310R always indicate lower EGTs than the other four cylinders. The exact same phenomenon also occurs on the right engine. This is not because those front cylinders produce cooler exhaust gas than their neighbors (they don’t), but because the exhaust risers for those cylinders curve aft while the other four risers go straight down. Thus, the gas flow past the EGT probe is different for the front cylinders than for the others, and their indicated EGT is lower. This temperature anomaly is quite obvious on my digital engine monitor¾and also quite meaningless.

What EGT means

Even if indicated EGT accurately reported actual exhaust gas temperature (which it doesn’t), it’s important to understand that exhaust gas temperature does not correlate with stress on the engine the way cylinder head temperature does. In fact, many things that increase engine stress (such as advanced ignition timing and high compression ratio) cause EGT to go down, while things that reduce engine stress (like retarded ignition timing and low compression ratio) cause EGT to go up.

Remember that CHT mainly reflects what’s going on in the cylinders during the power stroke when the cylinder is under maximum stress from high internal temperatures and pressures, while EGT mainly reflects what’s going on during the exhaust stroke after the exhaust valve opens and the cylinder is under relatively low stress.

High CHTs often indicate that the engine is under excessive stress, which is why it’s so important to limit CHTs to a tolerable value (no more than 400°, preferably 380° or less). By contrast, high EGTs do not indicate that the engine is under excessive stress, but simply that a lot of energy from the fuel is being wasted out the exhaust pipe rather than being extracted in the form of mechanical energy.

For instance, a 1972 Cessna 182 with an O-470-R engine will typically have indicated EGTs that are 100 degrees hotter than those seen in a 1977 Cessna 812 with an O-470-U engine. The -R has a relatively low 7.0–1 compression ratio because it was certificated for 80-octane avgas, while the -U engine has a much higher 8.6–1 compression ratio because it was certificated for 100-octane. Because the high-compression -U engine is significantly more efficient at extracting heat energy from the fuel, it wastes less energy out the exhaust and this its EGTs are cooler (despite the fact that the -U engine is much more highly stressed than the -R).

High EGTs do not represent a threat to cylinder longevity the way high CHTs do. Therefore, limiting EGTs in an attempt to be “kind to the engine” is simply misguided.

Diff versus Gami spread

Right behind the “high EGTs are bad” myth is the “identical EGTs are good” myth. Many pilots believe incorrectly that a flat-topped graphic engine monitor display (with all EGTs equal) is the mark of a well-balanced engine, and that unequal EGTs are a sign that something is wrong. This common misconception tends to be reinforced by digital engine monitors that display a digital “DIFF” showing the difference between the highest and lowest EGT indication.

As illustrated by the earlier anecdote about the front cylinders on my Cessna 310R, difference between absolute EGT values are both normal and benign. It is not uncommon for well-balanced fuel-injected engines to exhibit EGT spreads of 100 degrees, and carbureted engines often have spreads of 150 degrees or more. In fact, as shown in Figure 4, EGT spreads are usually smallest near or just rich of peak EGT (the worst place to operate the engine), and often significantly greater at leaner or richer mixture (that are much kinder to the engine.

The mark of a well-balanced engine is not a small EGT spread (“DIFF”), but rather a small “GAMI spread”– defined as the difference in fuel flows at which the various cylinders reach peak EGT. Ideally, we would like to see this peak be no more than about 0.5 gph (or 3 pph). Experience shows that if the GAMI spread is much more than that, the engine is unlikely to run smoothly with LOP mixtures.

It’s all relative

The only important thing about EGT is its relative value: how far below peak EGT and in which direction (e.g., 100 degrees ROP or 50 degrees LOP). Absolute values of EGT (e.g., 1,475 degrees) are simply not meaningful and are best ignored. There is no such thing as a maximum EGT limit or redline, and trying to keep absolute EGTs below some particular value¾or even worse, leaning to a particular absolute EGT value¾is simply wrongheaded. Don’t do it. If you must fixate on those digital engine monitor readouts, fixate on something important, like CHT.

Critical Component Failures

This article, by Mike Busch, originally appeared in the March 2010 issue of Sport Aviation as part three in the series “Reliability-Centered Maintenance.” We are reprinting it with the permission of the author.

To properly apply reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) principles to the maintenance of our piston aircraft engines, we need to analyze the failure modes and failure consequences of each major component part of those engines.

In this article we’ll examine the critical components of these engines, how they fail, what the consequences are of those failures on engine operation and safety of flight, and what sort of maintenance actions we can take to deal with those failures effectively and cost-efficiently.

Crankshaft

It’s hard to think of a more serious piston engine failure mode than a crankshaft failure. If it fails, the engine quits. Yet crankshafts are rarely replaced at overhaul. Lycoming says their crankshafts often remain in service for more than 14,000 hours and 50 years! TCM hasn’t published this sort of data, but TCM crankshafts probably have similar longevity.

Crankshafts fail in three ways: 1) infant-mortality failures due to improper material or manufacture, 2) failures following unreported prop strikes, and 3) failures secondary to oil starvation and/or bearing failure.

We’ve seen a rash of infant mortality crankshaft failures in recent years. Both TCM and Lycoming have had major recalls of crankshafts that were either forged from bad steel or were physically damaged during manufacture. Those failures invariably occurred within the first 200 hours after a newly manufactured crankshaft entered service. If a crankshaft survives the first 200 hours, we can be pretty confident that it was manufactured correctly and should perform reliably for many engine TBOs.

Unreported prop strikes seem to be getting rare because owners and mechanics are becoming smarter about the high risk of operating an engine after a prop strike. Both TCM and Lycoming state that any incident that damages the propeller enough that it has to be removed for repair warrants an engine teardown inspection. This applies even to prop damage that occurs when the engine isn’t running. Insurance will pay for the teardown and any necessary repairs, no questions asked, so it’s a no-brainer.

That leaves us with failures due to oil starvation and/or bearing failure. We’ll talk about these when we look at oil pumps and bearings.

Crankcase

Crankcases are also rarely replaced at major overhaul, and they often provide reliable service for many TBOs. If the case stays in service long enough, it will eventually crack. The good news is that case cracks propagate slowly, so a detailed annual visual inspection is sufficient to detect such cracks before they pose a threat to safety. Engine failures caused by case cracks are extremely rare.

Camshaft and lifters

The cam/lifter interface endures more pressure and friction than any other moving parts in the engine. The cam lobes and lifter faces must be hard and smooth in order to function and survive. Even tiny corrosion pits (caused by disuse or acid build-up in the oil) can lead to rapid destruction (spalling) of the cam and lifters and the need for a premature teardown. This is the number one reason that engines fail to make TBO. This problem mainly affects owner-flown airplanes because they tend to fly irregularly and sit unflown for weeks at a time.

Camshaft and lifter problems seldom cause catastrophic engine failures. The engine will continue to make power even with severely spalled cam lobes that have lost a lot of metal, although there is some small loss of power. Typically, the problem is discovered when the oil filter is cut open and found to be full of metal.

If the oil filter isn’t cut open and inspected on a regular basis, the cam and lifter failure may progress undetected to the point that ferrous metal circulates through the oil system and contaminates the engine’s bearings. In rare cases, this can cause catastrophic engine failure. A program of regular oil filter inspection and oil analysis will prevent such failures.

If the engine is flown regularly, the cam and lifters can remain in pristine condition for thousands of hours. Some overhaul shops routinely replace the cam and lifters with new ones at major overhaul, but other shops use reground cams and lifters and most knowledgeable engine experts agree that properly reground cams and lifters are just as reliable as new ones.

Gears

The engine has lots of gears: crankshaft and camshaft gears, oil pump and fuel pump drive gears, magneto and accessory drive gears, prop governor drive gears, and sometimes alternator drive gears. These gears typically have a very long useful life and are not usually replaced at major overhaul unless obvious damage is found. Gears rarely cause catastrophic engine failures.

Oil pump

Failure of the oil pump is occasionally responsible for catastrophic engine failures. If oil pressure is lost, the engine will seize quite quickly. The oil pump is very simple, consisting of two gears in a close-tolerance housing, and is usually trouble-free. When trouble does occur it usually starts making metal long before complete failure occurs. Regular oil filter inspection and oil analysis will normally detect oil pump problems long before they reach the failure point.

Bearings

Bearing failure is responsible for a significant number of catastrophic engine failures. Under normal circumstances, bearings have a very long useful life. They are always replaced at major overhaul, but it’s quite typical for bearings that are removed at overhaul to be in excellent (sometimes even pristine) condition with very little measurable wear. Bearings fail prematurely for three reasons: (1) they become contaminated with metal from some other failure; (2) they become oil-starved when oil pressure is lost; or (3) they become oil-starved because the bearing shells shift position in the crankcase saddles to the point where the bearing’s oil supply holes become misaligned (“spun bearing”).

Contamination failures can be prevented by using a full-flow oil filter and inspecting the filter for metal on a regular basis. So long as the filter is changed before its filtering capacity is exceeded, particles of wear metals will be caught by the filter and won’t contaminate the bearings. If significant metal is found in the filter, the aircraft should be grounded until the source of the metal is found and corrected.

Oil starvation failures are fairly rare. Pilots tend to be well-trained to respond to loss of oil pressure by reducing power and landing at the first opportunity. Bearings will continue to function properly even with fairly low oil pressure (e.g., 10 psi).

Spun bearings are usually infant mortality failures that occur either shortly after an engine is overhauled (assembly error), or shortly after cylinder replacement. Failures can also occur after a long period of crankcase fretting (which is detectable through oil filter inspection and oil analysis), or after extreme cold-starts without proper pre-heating. These are usually random failures, unrelated to hours or years since overhaul.

Connecting rods

Connecting rod failure is responsible for a significant number of catastrophic engine failures. When rod fails in flight, it often punches a hole in the crankcase and causes loss of engine oil and subsequent oil starvation. Rod failures have also been known to result in camshaft breakage. The result is invariably a rapid loss of engine power.

Connecting rods usually have a very long useful life and are not normally replaced at major overhaul. (The rod bearings, like all bearings, are always replaced at overhaul.) Some rod failures are infant mortality failures caused by improper torque of the rod cap bolts. Rod failures can also be caused by failure of the rod bearings, and these are usually random failures unrelated to time since overhaul.

Pistons and rings

Piston and ring failures can cause catastrophic engine failures, usually involving only partial power loss but occasionally total power loss. Piston and ring failures are of two types: (1) infant mortality failures due to improper manufacture or installation; and (2) heat-distress failures caused by pre-ignition or destructive detonation events. Heat-distress failures can be caused by contaminated fuel or improper engine operation, but they are generally unrelated to hours or years since overhaul. Use of a digital engine monitor can usually detect pre-ignition or destructive detonation episodes and allow the pilot to take corrective action before heat-distress damage occurs.

Cylinders

Cylinder failures can cause catastrophic engine failures, usually involving only partial power loss but occasionally total power loss. A cylinder has a forged steel barrel mated to an aluminum alloy head. Cylinder barrels normally wear slowly, and excessive wear is detected at annual inspection by means of compression tests and borescope inspections. However, cylinder heads can suffer fatigue failures, and occasionally the head can separate from the barrel, causing a catastrophic engine failure. Cylinder head failures can be infant mortality problems (due to improper manufacture) or can be age-related. Age-related failures seldom occur unless the cylinder is operated for more than two or three TBOs. Nowadays, most major overhauls include new cylinders, so age-related cylinder failures have become quite rare.

Valves and valve guides

It is quite common for valves and guides (particularly exhaust) to develop problems well short of TBO. Valve problems can usually be detected prior to failure by means of compression tests, borescope inspections, and surveillance with a digital engine monitor (provided the pilot knows how to interpret the engine monitor data). If a valve fails completely, a significant power loss can occur.

Rocker arms and pushrods

Rocker arms and pushrods (which operate the valves) typically have a very long useful life and are not routinely replaced at major overhaul. (Rocker arm bushings are always replaced at overhaul). Rocker arm failure is quite rare. Pushrod failures are caused by stuck valves and can almost always be avoided through repetitive valve inspections and digital engine monitor usage, as discussed earlier.

Magnetos

Magneto failure is uncomfortably commonplace. Fortunately, aircraft engines are equipped with dual magnetos for redundancy, and the probability of both magnetos failing simultaneously is extremely remote. Mag checks during pre-flight run-up can detect gross magneto failures, but in-flight mag checks are far better at detecting subtle or incipient failures. Digital engine monitors can reliably detect magneto failures in real time if the pilot knows how to interpret the data. Magnetos should be disassembled, inspected, and serviced every 500 hours—doing so drastically reduces the likelihood of an in-flight magneto failure.

The bottom line

The “bottom-end” components of these engines—crankcase, crankshaft, camshaft, bearings, gears, oil pump, etc.—are very robust. They normally exhibit very long useful lives that are many times as long as recommended TBOs. Most of these bottom-end components (with the notable exception of bearings) are reused at major overhaul and not replaced on a routine basis.

When these items do fail prematurely, the failures mostly occur shortly after engine manufacture, rebuild, or overhaul, or they are random failures that are unrelated to hours or years since overhaul. The vast majority of random failures can be detected long before they get bad enough to cause catastrophic engine failure simply by means of routine oil filter inspection and laboratory oil analysis. There seems to be no evidence that these bottom-end components exhibit any sort of well-defined steep-slope wear-out zone that would justify fixed-interval overhaul or replacement at TBO.

The “top-end” components—pistons, cylinders, valves, etc.—are considerably less robust. (The “top end” of a piston engine is analogous to the “hot section” of a turbine engine.) It is not unusual for top-end components to fail prior to TBO. However, most of these failures can be prevented by regular inspections (compression tests, borescope, etc.) and by use of digital engine monitors (by pilots who have been taught how to interpret the data). Furthermore, when potential failures are detected, the top-end components can be repaired or replaced quite easily without the need for engine teardown. Once again, the failures are mostly infant-mortality failures or random failures that do not correlate with time since overhaul.

The bottom line is that a detailed failure analysis of piston aircraft engines using RCM principles strongly suggests that what the airlines and military found to be true about turbine aircraft engines is also true of piston aircraft engines: The traditional practice of fixed-interval overhaul or replacement is counterproductive. A conscientiously applied program of on-condition maintenance that includes regular oil filter inspections, oil analysis, compression tests, borescope inspections, and in-flight digital engine monitor usage can be expected to yield improved reliability and much reduced maintenance expense and downtime.

Magnetos are an exception. They really need to go through a fixed-interval major maintenance cycle every 500 hours, because we have no effective means of detecting potential magneto failures without disassembly inspection.

About Mike Busch